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RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The statement of the case in the Brief of Appellee, while being stated in an
extremely Pro-Appellee manner is essentially correct with the exception of the following
details in which the Counsel for the Appellee attempts to mislead this court to establish an
unfavorable picture of Appellant's character. The Appellant will not take up the precious
time of this court by defending the many senseless allegations contained within the
Appellee's Statement of the case other than to expose just a few but important misleading
statements. These misleading statements are:
1.

The Appellee presents allegations of the Appellant being held in contempt of court
(item #15, page 5, Brief of Appellee). The Appellant has NEVER been held in
contempt of court in this or any other matter. The record does not support the
Appellee's claim as the record cannot contain something that did not happen.

2.

The Appellee presents allegations that the Appellant "decided the he was no longer
going to abide by the MOU (item #12, page 4, Brief of Appellee). The Appellant's
payment to Appellee history was admitted into evidence (Petitioner's Exhibit #29).
The history shows $32,945.00 in payments prior to the entry of any support order
and $27,475.00 after the entry of the support order with a 100% on-time payment
history,

3.

The Appellee presents an allegation of the Appellant causing the Appellee to lose a
client (item #22, page 7, Brief of Appellee) are totally baseless, untrue, and not
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supported by evidence.
4.

The claim that the Appellant informed the Appellee's counsel that he was no
longer working full time (item #19, page 6, Brief of Appellee) via telephone
conversations and in an Affidavit is also a misstatement as the Affidavit states the
exact opposite of the Appellee's claim (see item #4, page 84, Brief of Appellee).

RESPONSE TO ARGUMENT I
The Appellee states that the court articulated and sufficiently detailed facts that
supported its conclusion and that the Appellant's earning capacity remains the same as it
was in 2003 (p. 17, Brief of Appellee). The evidence properly admitted during the course
of the trial answers each specific question asked in the statutes regarding the incomes of
the parents and child support calculations to establish the 2003 baseline, the current
incomes of the parties as documented since the 2003 up until the trial in June of 2006
with particular focus on the time of the change in circumstances occurring on April 1,
2005. The evidence shows that each parent's income has either increased (Appellee) or
decreased (Appellant) 30% or more according to statute directed proof of income means
since 2003. The calculation of the proposed child support using these established current
incomes showed a decrease in child support greater than 15% required by law. Yet the
articulated findings of the court detail nothing concerning these material issues as brought
forth in the Petition to Modify.
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Thefindingsconcerning the Appellant's "earning capacity" are annual gross
income calculated monthly averages. These calculated averages fail to take into
consideration the timing of the salary reductions mandated to the Appellant by his
employer over the years as the salary rate would be higher than the average before the
change and lower than the average after the change. U.C.A. 78-45-7.5 states in subsection
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual basis and then
recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income. It is inappropriate for the
trial court to add past gross income to current gross income in order to create an inflated
"earning capacity" average that may not reflect the Appellant's future "probable
earnings". This method of "earning capacity" calculation shows the gross earnings
average of the Appellant and fails to continue on in the calculation of "adjusted gross
income" by deducting necessary business expenses as allowed in U.C.A. 78-45-7.5 (4)
(a). The adjusted gross income calculation is mandated by the word shall (U.C.A. 78-45-7.4).
Therefore, the trial court failed to articulate findings of fact in support of its
determination that "the Appellant failed to meet his burden of proof on all issues
contained within his petition to Modify Decree of Divorce".
As a footnote, the Appellee asserts that the Appellant has improperly cited the
record of the court. The admitted evidence from the June 27, 2006 trial has been
identified by trial court and cited to per court determined identifiers. The final orders of
the court were attached in the addendums of the Brief of the Appellant. The court stated
in West Jordan City v. Goodman 135 P. 3d 874 (Utah, 2006), that citations to the record
need not be perfect so long as the court is "nevertheless able to adequately navigate the
record with the citations provided".
-3-

RESPONSE TO ARGUMENT I (A).
The Appellee's argues that U.C.A. 78-45-7.2 dictates terms that the court may
consider in determining whether a substantial change in circumstances has occurred is
inconsistent with the wording of the statute. This argument is moot as it is made by a
incorrect reference to the statute as the word "may" is never stated in reference to the trial
court. U.C.A. 78-45-7.2 provides mandatory statutory directives to the trial court with a
measure of discretion provided in that the court must take into account the best interest of
the child. The court abuses its discretion when its discretion goes beyond that of the best
interests of the child and begins to use a measure of discretion on the statutory directives.
U.C.A. 78-45-7.2 is cited verbatim in the Brief of the Appellant and need not be reiterated.
The Appellant presented to the court as evidence, the original decree of divorce
(Petitioner's Exhibit #1) and the "Memorandum of Understanding" (Petitioner's Exhibit
#2) where neither document contains a provision addressing a possible material change in
circumstance such as this. This court has stated that "In order for a material change in
circumstances to be contemplated in a divorce decree, there must be evidence, preferably
in the form of a provision within the decree itself, that the trial court anticipated the
specific change" Haslem v. Haslem, Utah, 657 P.2d 757 (1982).
The standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in not
following the requirements of Law. The discretion that the trial court has in this matter is
only in the statement "taking into account the best interests of the child". The Brief of the

-4-

Appellee is void of an argument about the best interests of the child. The memorandum
and order of the trial court (R.932, addendum A, Brief of the Appellant) from which the
final order was drafted makes several statements concerning the well-being of the child
such as:
1)

The court was very pleased with Mr. Arnold's history of remaining a very

important of this child's life by giving substantially of his time and commitment to her
well being (R.932).
2)

He should be commended for the positive involvement he has with Alexa, as

that is normally the greatest problem this court encounters in this type of case. That fact
was also recognized in the trial by the Respondent Mother (R.932).
3)

The emotional well-being of a child weighs much greater than the material

things which were the primary subject of this hearing (R.932).
RESPONSE TO ARGUMENT I (A) (1).
The Brief of Appellee states that "Mr. Arnold presented no evidence that his
"underemployment" is anything but voluntary (page 20, Brief of Appellant). The evidence
of the Appellant's involuntary reduction in salary was presented to the court in the form of
the payment structure contract proposed by his employer. The contract details the annual
salary and the responsibility of the Appellant to pay for business related expenses
(Petitioner's Exhibit #10). The Appellant also presented a copy of an email from the
Appellant's employer's customer stating that there are restrictions to the Appellant
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performing duties for his employer that will not be reinstated despite the requests of the
Appellant (Petitioner's Exhibit #12). The Appellant has presented a letter from a former
contracted customer stating that" I have enjoyed working with you over the years and
regret that you were no longer able to continue working with us at Autoliv after THEY
decided to exclude you from there premises (Petitioner's Exhibit #13, emphasis added).
The Appellant's employer has mandated the reduction in salary without the Appellant
having any input in the matter. The Appellee presented no evidence that the so called
"underemployment" was voluntary other than stating that the Appellant's return to school
has affected his ability to earn. The return to school has no relevance in this matter and has
not been argued by the Appellant as a basis for the reduction in his salary.
The Appellee cites Hill v Hill 869 P.2d 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) in that this court
affirmed the trial court ruling that Mr. Hill was voluntarily underemployed because he had
voluntarily disregarded his family obligations when he left his job to pursue a different
career. Id, at 965 (emphasis added). He took a low paying job to return to school. Id. at
965. The Appellant asserts that this case in not applicable as the Appellant did not leave
his job voluntarily or involuntarily. At the time of the June 27, 2006 trial, the Appellant
remained employed full time for the same company and in the same position he has held
since 1997.
The Appellee cites Hall v Hall 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), stating that
"the court imputed income based off historical earning of the Appellant (Hall), as it was
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the only way to accurately gauge appellant's (Hall) income for purposes of determining his
child support obligations..." However, the Appellee fails to state that this is a trial court's
action and that this court reversed and remanded that ruling stating "trial court's failure to
make findings, explicit or implicit, concerning prevailing earnings for persons of similar
backgrounds to husband in community before calculating amount of income to impute to
husband was improper".
The final order of the trial court stated "the court has also considered the possibility
of the Appellant being required to move elsewhere in reaching the conclusion of voluntary
underemployment (R. 969). The court also stated "The emotional well-being of a child
weighs much greater than the material things which were the primary subject of this
hearing (R.932). The best interests of the child are not served by allowing the trial court to
have the ability to create its own criteria for the determination of voluntary
underemployment while disregarding the requiredfindingsof the law.
RESPONSE TO ARGUMENT I (A^ (2),
The Appellant has suffered a major reduction in his salary which more than doubles
the threshold to substantiate a substantial and material change in circumstances that went
into effect April 1, 2005. The Appellee continues to argue the circumstances at the time of
the mediated settlement in 2003 including past gross income amounts and a letter form the
Appellant to the Appellee discussing the pre-school the minor child was enrolled in when
she was four years old. Mandatory tuition for private school presents an unnecessary
burden when the public schools in the area are as capable as the private school for the
needs of the child.
The Appellee argues that "if there was no stipulation as to the amount of child
support, the court pursuant to statue would have awarded much more than the parties
stipulated" (P.25, Brief of Appellee). In a previous hearing, the trial court fully educated
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the Appellee's Attorney on the principal of linear extrapolation as detailed by this court in
Reinhartv.Reinhart 963 P.2d 757, 758 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
The Appellee has completely ignored the standard of review and is attempting to relitigate their position. The trial court does not have the authority to mandate that the minor
child attend private school without evidence being presented that public school is
inadequate for the child's needs. There was no evidence presented that in the best interests
of the child, she must attend this particular school.
RESPONSE TO ARGUMENT I (B).
The Appellee is incorrect in the argument that the Appellant is arguing that the
statutes governing modification of a divorce decree should be read strictly in a piecemeal
fashion. The Appellant's argument in the petition to modify, the argument at trial, and the
argument within the briefs of appeal are based on the complex web of interpretation of all
statutes as a whole. The trial court produced a finding of fact in its final order that "The
Court finds that the Respondent's [typographical error which should have been
Petitioner's] claimed income of $3,500.00, per month are inaccurate and are not
credible..." (R. 968-969, #11), yet the amount of $3,500.00 was determined through the
process outlined by statutory directives as detailed in the Brief of the Appellant (P. 14).
The Appellant fully acknowledges that the trial court has a measure of discretion
provided in "taking into account the best interest of the child". However, that measure of
discretion does not provide a blanket statement for the trial court to avoid statutory
directives, proper authority provided by this court, or the evidence admitted at trial. The
trial court made no findings regarding whether it [was or was not] in the best interests of
the child to find that a substantial and material change of circumstances had occurred.
The Appellee argues that the trial court's finding that, "[Mr. Arnold] has the notion
that child support guidelines must always control child support. Child expenses also
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generally continue to increase as children reach their teen years, even though the tables do
not reflect that" (R.969) is the trial court properly following legislative directives. This
argument is incorrect as the child support obligation table in U.C.A. 78-45-7.14 nor any
other statute leading to the use of the table is [age] driven. In order to deviate from the
child support guidelines the trial court must again follow statutory directives in U.C.A. 7845-7.2 subsection (3) "A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the
conclusion that complying with a provision of the guidelines or ordering an award amount
resulting from use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best
interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut the presumption in that case."
The finding that child expenses generally increase as children reach their teen years is not
within the discretion of the trial court and should be reversed.
RESPONSE TO ARGUMENT II.
The argument within the Brief of Appellee virtually ignores the standard of review
as the trial court must make findings on all material issues; failure to do so constitutes
reversible error. Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah Ct. App., 1988).
The Brief of the Appellant and the Brief of Appellee both agree that no evidence
was presented at trial regarding the allegation that the Appellee had misrepresented her
income as described within the amended petition to modify. The trial court had previously
ruled in "Order on Telephone Conference" (R. 929) signed by the trial court on June 12,
2006 (R.930) that "The court will not hear the Petitioner's Amended Petition to Modify
the Decree of Divorce at trial unless the Court feels that evidence from the case shows a
need to do so" (R.929). The trial court additionally added the following penned and
initialed in its own hand "as justified by the evidence at that time" (R. 929). If no evidence
was presented at trial, then the trial court must follow its own ruling in not hearing the
Amended Petition to Modify which it did not. In fact, the discovery requested by the
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Appellant was sealed by the trial court and not released per an "In Camera Review" of the
Appellee.
The material issue in this matter is regarding the alleged increase in the income of
the Appellee as raised in the Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce (Petitioner's Exhibit
#35). Did the Appellee's income materially change of 30% or more since the
establishment of the child support order? This alone would establish a substantial and
material change in circumstances. The evidence presented to the trail court as to the
income of Appellee was in the form of her tax returns for the years of 2004 and 2005 as
directed in U.C.A. 78-45-7.5 (5) (b). The Appellee was also able to deduct her necessary
business expenses as directed in U.C.A. 78-45-7.5 (4) illistrating an sustained adjusted
gross income of over $6,000.00 per month throughout 2004 and 2005.
The Appellee had a stipulated amount of income of $2,000.00 per month
(Petitioner's Exhibit #3, Brief of Appellee p. 65) and an income of S6,916.67 per month
for 2004 and $6,117.08 per month for 2005 (Petitioner's Exhibit #19). These amounts are
a material change of 300% [three hundred percent] or more in the income of a parent
making the material change in circumstances "substantial".
RESPONSE TO ARGUMENT IIL
Argument III within the Brief of Appellee virtually ignores the standard of review
as the trial court must make findings on all material issues; failure to do so constitutes
reversible error. Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah Ct. App., 1988). In
addition, the Appellee continues to attempt to re-litigate the issues which is not proper
before this court.
The award for attorney's fees rests soundly in the discretion of the trial court, which
the appellate court will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. The Appellee
correctly points out that "[i]n awarding attorney's fees, the trial court must consider 'the
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receiving spouses financial need,...,' (p.31, Brief of Appellee). The final order (R. 966971) of the trial court is void of this requirement. In the finding that the Appellant had the
ability to pay the reasonable attorney's fees, the trial court added a qualifying statement in
"the Petitioner is capable of paying attorney's fees incurred by the Respondent in this
matter and there being no merit to his claims" (R. 970, emphasis added).
The Appellee's income tax returns (Petitioner's Exhibit #19) show that the
Appellee's 2004 and 2005 annual income is a minimum of $50,000.00 higher than she is
claiming throughout this matter. While there is no evidence presented as to her income
claimed in 2003 of $2,000.00 per month, there is evidence that the Appellee can afford to
pay her own attorney's fee of $17,700.00 which does not even amount to half of the
annual $50,000.00 she is not claiming to earn in each of the two years leading to this trial.
CONCLUSION
The Legislature recognized the possibility that a parent would have a need to adjust
the amount of child support establish by statutory directives and therefore provided
statutory directives identifying the threshold in the establishment of a substantial and
material change of circumstances. The court is afford a measure of discretion in taking
into account the best interests of the child, but that discretion has limits to that end. If the
trial court does not find that the basic interests of the child are affected by the change in
circumstances, then that measure of discretion is satisfied and the court is mandated into
action. The evidence presented in this matter answers every statutory question presented in
the Appellant's Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce that a substantial and material
change in circumstances has occurred two fold with both parent's income material change
of 30% or more. The trial court made findings regarding the "best interests of the child"
commending both parents on the well being of the child and their positive involvement in
her life.
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The trail court has been given the stewardship of determining the answers to
statutory questions when a parent by statutory right, petitions the court for a modification
to a Decree of Divorce. The trial court is directed by statute how to answer the questions
within a measure of discretion, concerning a material and substantial change in
circumstances, voluntary underemployment, the establishment of adjusted gross income
for the purpose of calculating child support, etc. Each and every statutory question brought
before the trial court in the Appellant Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce can be
answered within the admitted evidence identified as Petitioner's Exhibits.
The trial court's order and findings of fact in this matter are not appropriate in this
case. The court found that the Appellant failed to meet his burden of proof on all issue, yet
all answers to the statutory questions can be found within the evidence provided to the trial
court through statutory directed means. The trial court found that the Appellant was
"voluntarily underemployed", yet no findings were made in support of this finding other
than the Appellant's average earnings from the past were higher. The Appellant is and has
been employed in a job since 1997 that requires all of his qualifications with a salary that
is more than he can get in another position with a different company. Reasons for the
changes in the Appellant's salary were explained in detail at trial, however transcripts for
the trial were unavailable as there was an electronic equipment failure in the recording of
the proceedings. This failure in preserving the transcripts is a harmless error on behalf of
the trial court as long as it does no affect the rights of the parties.
The lack of statutory required findings fails to give the Appellate Court the ability
to affirm the conclusions of law speculatively made by the trial court. The Appellant
provided the trial court with the necessary information to meet his burden of proof in
establishing that there has been a material and substantial change in circumstances. There
is no basis for a finding of "voluntary underemployment". The court has no authority to
order that the minor child must attend private school. The trial court did not enter a finding
-12-

as to the financial need of the Appellee (Respondent) as the evidence shows that she has
the income to take responsibility for the fees incurred.
Based on the evidence before it, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to
modify the decree of divorce in the establishment of an appropriate child support amount
in line with current adjusted gross incomes, eliminate the mandatory payment of private
school tuition and fees, and in its award of the Appellee's attorney's fees in this matter.
SIGNED AND DATED This /&—

day of April, 2007.

/)-^e^<^0>
Alan D. Arnold, Petitioner/Appellant
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